Passing the Baton: Analyzing the Presidency of Barack Obama
Reflection's on Hofstra University's 13th Presidential Conference, Barack Obama: Hope and Change
Hofstra University’s 13th Presidential Conference opened with a message from President Barack Obama addressing how his legacy should be evaluated. The former president said in a video, “As president, you’re just a relay runner. Your job is to run your leg the best you can, and then hand the baton off to someone else.”
The American presidency is a unique institution, allocated great power but given limited time to use it. Obama’s metaphor is an effective reference to use when determining his legacy. His rise was greeted with high expectations of “hope and change”, but in the end the return was low. Obama was like a runner expected to win gold by a long shot, but during the race comes in 4th. In regard to domestic policy, President Obama worked hard to move the baton as far as he could, but was met with a surplus of challenges outside of his control. When it came to foreign affairs, the president acted contrary to many of his priorities.
As a result of his moderate domestic successes, mainly the passage of Obamacare, and uninspiring record on foreign policy, his legacy will hold a mediocre place in history. Despite this, the 44th president will always be remembered for his historic campaign and election as the first black president.
As a student participant in the conference, I had the opportunity to write several essays analyzing and evaluating the Obama presidency and the numerous papers presented. This weeks Underlined is a compilation of my pieces about the Obama presidency and the presidential conference.
The Speech that ‘Made Obama President’
When Barack Obama was elected as the 44th president in 2008, many credited his meteoric rise to his powerful speech at the 2004 Democratic National Convention. Pundits and historians have termed it “the speech that made Obama president”. A speech so good it empowered a virtually unknown politician to rise to the presidency must be incredible! Obama is frequently credited with being one of the greatest public orators of his generation. His sternly deep voice paired with his relaxed and clear style has won the former president three Grammy nominations, two of which he won. What about Obama’s style makes his speeches so effective? What made his 2004 keynote address so powerful?
In 2004, the mood in the United States was dull. Just three years after the devastating attacks on 9/11, Americans were fighting overseas in a costly and increasingly unpopular war. The economy was in a downturn, and political polarization was heating up. Pro-war voters were decried as killers, while anti-war voters were branded as unpatriotic. Few felt they shared a sense of community with their countrymen. Politics had become too divisive. America was divided between red states and blue states, urban and rural, Black and white. While many lost faith, Barack Obama, a youthful Illinois state senator had hope.
Democrats were to nominate Massachusetts Senator John Kerry to take on President George W. Bush. The party planned their convention in Boston, and on July 26, the proceedings got underway. For several days the newly elected Illinois state senator sat in his hotel and attempted to craft a speech to move the delegates and the nation. After going back and forth with his advisors, making edits and revisions, Obama completed his eighteen minute keynote address. On Tuesday, July 27, the up and coming Senator Obama entered the Fleet Center to introduce himself to the nation. The speech begins with Obama explaining his heritage and his fathers immigration to the United States from Kenya. He said, “I stand here knowing that my story is part of the larger American story, that I owe a debt to all of those who came before me, and that, in no other country on earth, is my story even possible.” The future president went on to connect his personal story to his wider hope for America.
Despite speaking to a room full of Democrats, Obama continued by saying, “And fellow Americans - Democrats, Republicans, Independents - I say to you tonight: we have more work to do.” Expanding his audience to all Americans, makes the speech inclusive to all listeners. Obama outlines his and John Kerry’s beliefs for America through their shared policy goals. As he concludes his address, Obama says, “Yet even as we speak, there are those who are preparing to divide us, the spin masters and negative ad peddlers who embrace the politics of anything goes.” He continues through using repetition to declare, “there's not a liberal America and a conservative America - there's the United States of America. There's not a black America and white America and Latino America and Asian America; there's the United States of America”. Obama declares that, “Pundits like to slice-and-dice our country into Red States and Blue States; Red States for Republicans, Blue States for Democrats. But I've got news for them, too. We worship an awesome God in the Blue States, and we don't like federal agents poking around our libraries in the Red States. We coach Little League in the Blue States and have gay friends in the Red States. There are patriots who opposed the war in Iraq and patriots who supported it. We are one people, all of us pledging allegiance to the stars and stripes, all of us defending the United States of America.”
Obama's use of symbolism and repetition enables an emotive expression of his hope, connecting his speech to a greater purpose. His pleas to vote for John Kerry are paired with his belief in unity. He begins his speech speaking softly and as he progresses, his voice becomes louder and more emotive, pulling the audience to listen. Obama uses emphasis on certain words and sentences. He adjusts his delivery to match his purpose. At one point towards the end, he engages with the audience asking, “Do we participate in a politics of cynicism or a politics of hope?” to which the crowd thunderously responds, “Hope!”, effectively grabbing their attention and including them in the speech.
Obama used his 2004 keynote address to inspire, persuade, and captivate the nation, fueling his rise to the presidency just four years later. Obama’s speech should be used as a model for future speakers and as an inspiring example of moving an audience towards hope.
Failures to Identify Opportunity in the Obama Presidency
A theoretical framework for analyzing Obama
In Predicting the Presidency, George C. Edwards III makes a compelling argument that presidents should be judged by their ability to evaluate and act upon opportunities.1 The presidency of Barack Obama represented a mixed bag of ups and downs. Using the methods and theories articulated by Edwards, the outcome of these incidents can be better understood and the Obama administration can be better analyzed.
Through theories of presidential power and decision-making, the numerous factors that contribute to a presidents success or failure can be evaluated and judged accordingly. Edwards argues that the “persuasion theory” of presidential power argued by Richard Neustadt is an ineffective and incomplete way to evaluate a president. The dynamics between voters and the president, voters and Congress, and the president and Congress are too complicated to be analyzed through a single lens of persuasion. Edwards argues that throughout each term, presidents will face a range of scenarios and problems. Presidents should be evaluated on how well they manage these challenges and how they find and exploit the opportunities afforded to them.
Edwards does not completely discount Neustadt's theory of presidential persuasion, but he argues that it lacks the complexed existence of the office. especially during the Obama presidency. Presidents face difficulty communicating with voters and representatives. Edwards writes, “Despite all their efforts to lead public opinion, presidents do not directly reach the American people on a day-to-day basis.”2 Similar to their relationship with the public, presidents face significant challenges in their attempt at persuading members of Congress. Edwards writes, “We should not infer success in winning elections that the White House can persuade members of Congress and the public to change their minds on the thing they wouldn’t.”3 As Edwards correctly articulates, the ability for presidents to change public opinion and move votes in Congress is incredibly difficult if not impossible. Persuasion is not a cogent way of judging a president's success. Edwards writes that Obama, “[bought] into the myth of persuasiveness” which ultimately “undermined his ability to compromise.”4 Obama was bad at building relationships with members of Congress, creating tense Republican adversaries and unenthused Democratic friends. To understand the Obama presidency and rate its efficacy in utilizing advantages, minimizing difficulties, and exploiting opportunities, the decisions and actions he took during specific flashpoints of his presidency must be evaluated.
On December 14, 2012, a deranged 20-year-old opened fire on a first-grade classroom at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown Connecticut. Twenty students were killed alongside 6 of their teachers. As the nation mourned, President Obama got to work attempting to utilize the opportunity structure he perceived the tragedy provided and effectuate meaningful gun legislation. Edwards argues that with the millions spent by the gun lobby each year, paired with the passionate views of gun enthusiasts, any attempt at persuading representatives or voters would be “extremely difficult to win against.”5 To move the entrenched views of Republican lawmakers, the president would have to mobilize the public. In January 2013, polls put public support for background checks for gun purchasers at over 90%. Support for banning assault weapons stood at 58% and support for generally stricter gun laws was 57%.6 As the president began to rally, support for his proposals began to fall. Obama poured his energy into attempting to exploit the opportunity, but Edwards argues he misinterpreted his abilities, and set himself up for failure. The partisan divide over gun reform and the intense passion both sides brought, enabled Republicans to lean more into their views and fight the president's attempt. Edwards writes, “Exploiting opportunities requires that there be opportunities in the first place…There were few opportunities for the president to exploit.”7 When it came to gun reform, President Obama failed because he misunderstood the dynamics between voters, the president, and Congress.
Presidents struggle over the constraints of public opinion. When Obama began to push for healthcare reform in 2009, he believed he could get the hesitant public to support his Affordable Care Act. The president campaigned vigorously and thought his efforts would correlate with support, but again he misunderstood the dynamics of persuasion and public opinion. Presidents can use established support to emphasize initiatives and mobilize change. President Obama spent his political capital on pushing an unpopular measure, costing him congressional support for the rest of his presidency. Obama faced difficulties because of motivated reasoning and its contrasting effects. While the president's supporters put their energy into arguing for Obamacare, his adversaries put their energy into arguing against it. Presidents cannot seek to persuade in a vacuum. When presidents fight for something, they should expect an equally powerful force to be against it. President Obama’s success at passing the Affordable Care Act, paired with his eventual loss of support and power, signals he failed to understand the rigid dynamics of public opinion.
When attempting to build support for initiatives, presidents sometimes have the opportunity to use events to build broad inter-party coalitions. Presidents believe that they can garner support from a swath of their supporters and a swath of their adversaries based on established partisan support and principled beliefs. Edwards calls this strategy “cross-pressuring” and rates its efficacy as mostly weak at creating broad support, especially during the Obama administration when polarization ran high. In 2013, former National Security Agency (NSA) employee Edward Snowden leaked documents indicating that the government was conducting questionable programs to spy on Americans and infringe on their privacy. Before the leak, 2006 polls indicated that 75% of Republicans viewed these surveillance programs as acceptable, while 61% of Democrats viewed them as unacceptable. As the executive leader, President Obama was forced into defending them, and the partisan divide over the NSA programs was dissolved with both parties almost equally split over the issue.8 President Obama hoped to utilize this broad support to uphold these programs and find common ground. The president's attempt at cross-pressuring was ineffective at building broad support because bipartisan support was short-lived. Edwards writes, “Because cross-pressuring asks people to move against their policy proclivities, it may have only short-term effects if it has any at all. Despite the pull of partisanship, it is difficult to turn people against their core instincts.” Cross-pressuring is only so effective at creating movement on specific issues for a short time.
Building and maintaining power while pushing initiatives is difficult for a president to achieve. Edwards presents a compelling and effective lens for judging a presidency, through their ability to identify and exploit opportunities. President Obama was not effective at understanding these challenges and failed to identify opportunities and build support.
“Obama, the Pen, and the Phone”
An analysis of Donna R. Hoffman and Alison D. Howard’s paper, “Obama, the Pen, and the Phone”
The presidency of Barack Obama exhibited many evolving features of the institution, including the growth of unilateral executive actions. In “Obama, the Pen, and the Phone”, Donna R. Hoffman and Alison D. Howard wrote of Obama’s executive actions and his rhetorical attempts to advertise and defend them, through his vision of the “American Dream.”
The authors begin their analysis by noting that while every president comes to office with high, often unrealistic expectations, Obama's 2008 campaign provided him with a colossal challenge. As discussed in other papers and books, outsiders often misunderstand the scope and difficulty presidents face when effectuating policy. As Hoffman and Howard note, “Presidents don’t get wands.”9 Obama could not simply push his legislation through the rigid and unwavering Congress. So rather than wait or continue to work to compromise and convince, President Obama turned to his pen to sign unilateral executive actions (UEAs), like executive orders, memoranda, and proclamations.
While Obama became known to flaunt his executive actions, UEAs have become staple tools of presidential power. Hoffman and Howard divide the president's rhetoric around his executive actions (some might say oversteps) into two categories: high-profile and low-profile. In 2014, the president made his first “high profile” remark about his strategy, saying, “I've got a pen to take executive actions where Congress won't, and I've got a telephone to rally folks around the country on this mission.”10 Obama’s statement is exemplary of his overarching rhetorical tone and political actions. He continuously argued that he only signed UEAs because Congress refused to act. Obama felt congressional inaction forced him into using his metaphorical pen. At the same time, Obama talked down his actions, saying multiple times that “I have actually taken fewer executive actions than my predecessors. Nobody disputes that.”11 People disputed it. While taking a defensive tone, the president frequently flaunted his UEAs as a defense of the American Dream.
Obama attempted to walk a tightrope between talking down his UEAs, while highlighting their success. He wanted to make it clear that he was “acting in the public interest, not acting for power’s sake.”12 Through congressional inaction, the president's rhetoric, and the office’s evolution, Obama's “pen and phone” strategy are essential to analyze for understanding his presidency.
Obama’s Shortcomings on Gun Policy
An analysis of Robert J. Spitzer’s paper, “The Obama Presidency and Gun Policy”
Few issues mobilized and energized voters during the Obama presidency as much as gun policy. Despite very little dialogue regarding the issue throughout his first term, President Obama’s 2012 campaign and his second term focused intensely on the issue. In his paper, “The Obama Presidency and Gun Policy”, Robert J. Spitzer analyzes the Obama presidency through the lens of gun policy.13
During his historic 2008 campaign, Barack Obama focused very little on gun policy—and when he did it was often in an attempt to portray himself as an advocate of the Second Amendment. All of the major candidates in 2008 had a mixed and criticized record on gun policy. Spitzer provides a significant background of the political status of gun reform in elections since the Columbine High School Shooting in 1999. The shortcomings of Al Gore, paired with his often aggressive rhetoric on the issue, lowered Democrats' desires to bring gun reform to the forefront of their campaigns.
Throughout his first term, President Obama continued his complacency with gun policy, while presiding over the passage of several laws which loosened gun restrictions. Spitzer writes, “Brady Campaign, a pro-gun safety organization, gave him a failing grade of “F” on the issue after his first year in office.”14 While Obama's first term neglected any discussion of gun reform, 2012 welcomed, what Spitzer calls a “second term reverse.” (8) Following a string of high profile mass shootings in 2012, including the Aurora Colorado movie theater shooting in July, and the Sandy Hook School shooting in December, the president quickly mobilized on the issue.
While Congress seemed to stalemate, the president opted to take things into his own hands, pressuring legislators, and issuing a series of executive actions that attempted to strengthen databases, study gun violence, and require more robust background checks. In addition to these newly emerged policies, Obama tapped Vice President Joe Biden to lead a gun reform task force to turn his “anguish and outrage” into action.15 The president's actions only went so far, and efforts to pass gun reform through Congress consistently fell flat, even when attempted by NRA-supported members.
Throughout the continuation of his second term, the political climate surrounding gun reform intensified. Spitzer concludes by noting that attempting to push “social-regulatory” policies like gun reform are difficult but not impossible. Had Obama not spent his first term inactive on the issue, he may have been more successful at achieving significant reforms. The tragedy at Sandy Hooked did not have the mobilizing effects on staunch gun supporters as Obama would have hoped. Obama's record on gun policy can be summarized by saying he tried, but fell short.
The Failed Promises of Obama’s Middle East Policy
Barack Obama came to the presidency with a promise of hope and change. On every level of his platform and campaign rhetoric, the charismatic outsider pledged to shake up the system and create transformational change. In wake of the increasingly unpopular war in Iraq led by President George W. Bush, Obama promised to re-establish American diplomacy and leadership on the world stage, primarily through policy in the Middle East. From his pledge to promote peace and establish stability, to his promise to negotiate a lasting deal with Iran, President Obama’s foreign policy realities failed to meet the high expectations he set.
On October 9, 2009, President Obama woke to news he had been given the Nobel Peace Prize. While the new president had been in office for less than 9 months, the Nobel Committee hoped the award would inspire his presidency to meet their high bar of promoting peace. After meeting with his advisors weighing whether or not to accept, Obama delivered a speech saying, “I will accept this award as a call to action—a call for all nations to confront the common challenges of the 21st century.” On the same day of his Nobel victory, the president met to discuss options for escalating the war in Afghanistan.16 By the end of his presidency, it was clear the Nobel Committees' hopes had been a failure.
In addition to his prospective Nobel award, Obama's 2009 speech delivered in Cairo Egypt promised a “New Beginning” for US–Middle East relations. His optimistic hopes for democracy, rights, and peace in the Middle East were trounced countless times throughout his presidency. In his memoir, A Promised Land, the former president acknowledged the contrast between his rhetoric and his service, writing, “In later years, critics and even some of my supporters would have a field day contrasting the lofty. hopeful tone of the Cairo speech with the grim realities that would play out in the Middle East during my two terms in office.”17
As the country moved further from 2001 and the botched occupation of Iraq was on full display, the American people were ready to withdraw. In 2007, President Bush agreed to a fazed departure. By 2011, withdrawal was set to be complete, and President Obama committed to upholding Bush’s agreement. After declaring a total withdrawal would be finished by the end of the year, the president said, "After nearly nine years, America's war in Iraq will be over." It soon became clear that after nearly a decade of involvement, the United States withdrawal would open a power vacuum that was quickly filled by a radical terrorist network known as ISIS. By 2014, the threat of ISIS became so severe Obama had to renege on his withdrawal and send thousands of troops back to fight off the new terror threat. The initial 2003 invasion destabilized Iraqi institutions allowing for a power vacuum to emerge once troops had left, so while Obama cannot be directly blamed for the emergence of ISIS, it's clear his withdrawal did not help. Regardless of who is to blame, the global threat of ISIS dashed the president's high hopes for global peace and US sanctioned stability in the tumultuous region.
While his 2009 speech in Cairo signaled that a new day of US–Middle East policy was on the horizon, Obama continued some of the harmful tactics he ridiculed his predecessors for. In March 2011, the United Nations passed Resolution 1973, authorizing military intervention in Libya. The resolution, spearheaded by the administration, was reminiscent of the status-quo US policy of intervening in foreign affairs without a solid plan of action. As the Arab Spring erupted across the Arab world, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, fearful of being overthrown by pro-democracy protesters, began a forceful crackdown. After failing to outwardly support earlier protests in Iran and Egypt, Obama felt it was necessary to right his past wrongs. Obama ordered airstrikes on Gaddafi's troops. While at first, it seemed that intervention would be successful, things quickly spiraled in the North African nation. Rather than preside over a peaceful trial and transition of power, protesters brutally tortured Gaddafi, beating, shooting, and sodomizing him until he died in a sewer drain. With Gaddafi gone, following his four decades of leadership, Libya's institutions crumbled, culminating in a decade-long civil war. Islamic terrorist groups seized on the opportunity, launching a reign of terror on Libyans worse than what Gaddafi had ever engaged in. On September 11, 2012, terrorists attacked a US diplomatic compound in Libya, killing a US ambassador and four others. The political fallout of the failure in Libya and the violent attack on the US diplomats hung over Obama for the rest of his presidency. In 2016, Obama characterized his lack of preparedness going into Libya as his “worst mistake.”
As Obama’s promise for peace and stability in the Middle East crumbled, he attempted to make good on his pledge to rebuild the United States' relationship with Iran. Following decades of tension rooted back to the fallout of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, President Obama began to negotiate a deal to limit the power of Iran's nuclear capabilities. The rapprochement approach to Iran was a part of the administration's larger goal to build relationships with foreign and often outdated US adversaries. In his history of the Obama years, Obama: A Call of History, journalist Peter Baker writes, “When he first ran for president, Obama had promised to talk with leaders of renegade states like Cuba, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Venezuela without precondition in his first year in office.”18 While Obama was mostly hostile to Iran during his first term, strategy in his second was geared toward negotiation. The president recognized the crucial threat Iran's nuclearization could pose to the United States and our allies in the region—mainly Israel.
To halt the production of nuclear weapons, Obama negotiated an agreement in which the United States would lift sanctions in exchange for Iran closing its nuclear facilities. The second, more controversial exchange was the release of millions of dollars of Iranian funds that had been frozen by the US since the hostage crisis in 1979. By 2015, Iran, the United States, and several foreign powers, including China, Russia, and the European Union came to an agreement, exchanging billions of dollars worth of sanction relief to Iran for closing nuclear facilities and opening remaining ones up to international oversight. The deal included sunset clauses, which set its key provisions to expire in 10 to 15 years. While Obama used the might of the presidency to negotiate the agreement, Congress rejected it. In 2018, President Trump withdrew from the Iran Nuclear Deal and reinstated sanctions. Since the US withdrawal, the deal has mostly fallen through and there is evidence Iran has continued their nuclear program. While President Obama made a good effort to negotiate Iranian denuclearization, his failure to build consensus at home resulted in it being another missed mark of his foreign policy.
While President Obama came to office with high expectations for peace and stability in a region notorious for its chaos, reality quickly caught up. Like many aspects of his presidency, Obama's foreign policy fits the pattern of high hopes falling apart.
Obama’s “Red Line”
An analysis of Daniel E. Ponder and Jeffrey VanDenBerg’s paper “Why Ask?”
In “Why Ask?,” Daniel E. Ponder and Jeffrey VanDenBerg analyze President Obama’s decision to seek congressional authorization for using force in Syria following Bashar Al Assad's suspected use of chemical weapons in 2013. President Obama “drew a red line” regarding chemical weapons in Syria in 2012, saying, “We have been very clear to the Assad regime…that a red line for us is, [when] we start seeing a whole bunch of weapons moving around or being utilized.”19 While the president's rhetoric was tough, a year later, when over 1,400 Sryians were killed by a chemical weapon, his pledge fell through and decisive intervention was not taken.
When it became clear that chemical weapons had been deployed in Syria, the president dragged his feet toward declaring his red line had been crossed. Rather than order a direct military strike, Obama turned to Congress; a concerningly rare but important step by a president. Obama argued that he was attempting to seek authorization to ensure congressional consent and respect the Constitution, though, as Ponder and VanDenBerg note, he had neglected to do this in the past. Obama maintained that regardless of Congress’s approval, he still had the authority to conduct a military operation if he deemed it necessary. Despite the president's efforts, Congress rejected the authorization. The lack of US response following the chemical carnage and President Obama's “red line” weakened the strength of US commitments and pledges globally.
Ponder and VanDenBerg evaluate the several reasons why President Obama would hesitate to take action and seek authorization before ordering strikes. They dismiss the president's reasoning, arguing that if Obama truly wanted to respect the Constitution and Congress he would have done so during the operations conducted in Libya as well. They suggest Obama may have wanted to wiggle out of the “red box” he trapped himself into and use Congress to slow things down in hope another solution would reveal itself. While this is possible, it’s unlikely the White House would have worked so hard and urgently to get members on their side. It seems most plausible that Obama believed seeking authorization would prompt a “rally around the flag” moment, increase his popularity, and unify some factions in Congress. While the public respected the president's decision, his other aspirations did not come to fruition.
While presidents should abide by the Constitution and seek congressional approval whenever military action is conducted, phony lines should not be drawn and the United States must stand by its commitments. Ponder and VanDenBerg present a robust and mostly accurate analysis of President Obama’s decision.
Historic, but Mediocre: A Conclusion of the Obama Presidency
President Obama engaged with several policy issues during his eight years, though the impact of Obamacare will be the most significant. Despite its numerous criticisms and shortcomings, the Affordable Care Act reshaped the dynamic of healthcare in the United States. For several decades healthcare reform was a top priority of Democrats. While Bill Clinton's 1993 to 1994 attempts to pass a comprehensive healthcare plan ended in failure, Obama pledged to carry his proposal to the end. Obamacare, modeled after the Massachusetts healthcare system, sought measured, but far-reaching reforms to require insurers to expand coverage and minimize the number of uninsured Americans, through expanding both public and private health care plans. Despite large Democratic majorities in Congress, the president was met with firm resistance and unforeseen challenges. Following the death of Ted Kennedy in 2010, Massachusetts elected Republican Scott Brown to the Senate, giving Republicans enough seats to sustain a filibuster and block the controversial bill. Throughout 2009 into 2010, Obama’s negotiations and compromises with Republicans stalled and after Brown’s victory, “Obama’s health care bill was dead.”20 The president refused to give up, pushing Democrats in the House to sacrifice their seats for a “yea.” After several months of intense negotiations, the Affordable Care Act passed in March 2010. The historic health care reform secured more than 20 million Americans with insurance and created a legislative infrastructure for future reforms. Despite the president's success, the passage of Obamacare resulted in the loss of Democratic control of the House in 2010 and drained the new president's political capital, sacrificing the possibility of success on other priorities. This exchange makes the Affordable Care Act President Obama’s most significant policy achievement.
Other issues President Obama would liked to have tackled included gun and immigration reform. On the gun debate, Obama was complacent regarding gun policies until the 2012 shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown Connecticut. Following Sandy Hook, Obama mobilized and engaged his administration in attempting to seek a legislative response. Despite his intense efforts, Obama failed to preside over any meaningful gun reform, though his second term saw the rise of political activism and organization over guns, creating a lasting mark on the policy landscape.
While Obama faced several difficulties outside of his control on domestic policy, he failed to effectuate meaningful foreign policy, even when he could. One of the president's worst failures came from his blunder in Libya. Seeking to avoid the criticisms his lack of action spurred during the Arab Spring protests in 2011, Obama took decisive action against Muammar Gadaffi when the dictator began to violently crack down on protests. After the US led intervention, the Libyan government collapsed and civil war broke out. The failed affair led to Obama considering the incident to be one of his lowest points.
The president's troop withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 resulted in a power vacuum to emerge and terrorist networks like ISIS to form. By 2014, President Obama had to renege on his pull-out and resupply thousands of troops to take on ISIS, after months of downplaying their threat and “not taking it seriously.”21 Obama’s increasing use of drone weaponry is considered by many to also be a black mark on his foreign record. Nearly 10% of Obama’s drone strike deaths were civilians, a significantly higher proportion than other methods of counterterrorism. Obama’s persistent use of drone technology prompted him to grossly remark in 2011, “I’m really good at killing people.” 22
Regardless of his policy record, President Obama’s 2008 campaign and his political skills are fundamental aspects for evaluating his legacy. As the United States struggled through economic turmoil, several wars, and increasing polarization, Obama’s campaign inspired a sense of “hope and change.” His sudden break onto the political scene in 2004 as a result of his speech at the Democratic National Convention, displayed a political rise like few others in history. His intense charisma and talented oratory provided “the skinny kid with a funny name” the political skills that launched him to the presidency.23 Obama’s 2008 campaign mobilized voters using social media and set a model for how campaigns are run in the 21st Century. In addition to his organization and political abilities, Obama’s mere election as the first Black president will likely be the most remembered feature of his presidency. The election of a Black person to the most powerful office in the world has inspired future generations of Black Americans while ushering in a more nuanced age of racial politics.
Obama’s moderate domestic successes, paired with his uninspiring record on foreign policy underscore his legacy. The election of America's first Black president will lift Obama’s historic profile and encapsulate his legacy—likely more than he would like it to.
Edwards, George C. Predicting the Presidency: The Potential of Persuasive Leadership. Princeton University Press, 2016.
Ibid, 160.
Ibid, 1.
Ibid, 4-11.
Ibid, 61.
Ibid, 62-63.
Ibid, 35.
Ibid, 140.
Hoffman, Donna R., and Alison D. Howard. “Obama, the Pen, and the Phone.” Hofstra University’s 13th Presidential Conference: Barack Obama, 44th President of the United States, April 2023. Accessed 25 March 2023. 1.
Ibid, 4.
Ibid, 5.
Ibid, 27.
Spitzer, Robert J. “The Obama Presidency and Gun Policy.” Hofstra University’s 13th Presidential Conference on The Barack Obama Presidency April 19-21, 2023, 2023.
Ibid, 8.
Ibid, 11.
Baker, Peter. Obama: The Call of History. Harry N. Abrams, 2017.
Obama, Barack. A Promised Land. Crown, 2020. 366.
Bake, Peter. Obama: The Call of History. Harry N. Abrams, 2017. 312.
Ponder, Daniel E., and Jeffrey VanDenBerg. “Why Ask? Presidential Leverage and Obama’s Decision to Seek Congressional Authorization for the Use of Force against Syria.” The Barack Obama Presidency: Hope and Change, Hofstra University, April 19-21, 2023. 1
Obama, Barack. A Promised Land. Crown, 2020. 418.
Baker, Peter. Obama The Call of History. Harry N. Abrams, 2017. 264.
Ibid, 189.
Younge, Gary. “'Skinny kid with a funny name' reshapes US politics.” The Guardian, 4 January 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jan/05/barackobama.uselections20081. Accessed 17 May 2023.