The Overshadowed and Blundered Presidency of William Howard Taft

The presidency of William Howard Taft has fallen into historic obscurity in the minds of most Americans. Sandwiched between two iconic leaders that dominated headlines throughout and directly following his term, Taft was doomed to be forgettable from the moment he was elected in 1908. In a 1925 letter written 13 years after his term ended, Taft wrote, “In my present life I don’t remember that I ever was president.”¹ Reading an account of Taft’s presidency, the names Roosevelt and Wilson dominate. In addition to being overshadowed, Taft was an incomplete politician, thrusting himself into a handful of unnecessary controversies that plagued his presidency. He presided over a split in the Republican Party that culminated in their losing control of Congress and the presidency for the first time in decades. The domestic issues that arose during his presidency were standard and inconsequential, while his dealings in foreign affairs were even duller. Despite his flaws and contrasts to Roosevelt and Wilson, the Taft presidency is interesting in several ways. Despite his lack of political skill, Taft was an excellent administrator and jurist. His efficient and productive executive practices left a lasting impact on the office. It is essential in understanding the Progressive Era, to appreciate and make sense of the Taft presidency. The four years between 1908 and 1912 present a profound shift in the progressive movement. Taft's political incompetence stopped him from seizing the changing tides, resulting in his presidency seeming like a missed opportunity. 

As his second term waned in 1908, Theodore Roosevelt sought to find a successor that would dutifully carry on his legacy. Roosevelt had long admired the service of his friend William Howard Taft. The Ohio lawyer turned judge first worked under Benjamin Harrison as solicitor general from 1890 to 1892, before receiving an appointment to preside over the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In 1900, President McKinley appointed Taft as the civil governor of the Philippines following the United States conquest during the Spanish American War. As governor, Taft managed to successfully execute his authority while maintaining general popularity with the Filipino people. When Roosevelt became president in 1901, he maintained Taft in this position before appointing him as secretary of war in 1904. Taft worked to follow the president's orders and execute the administration of the War Department productively. His willingness to serve and act within Roosevelt's vision launched him to the Republican nomination in 1908. Despite his passion for the office, Roosevelt had declared that “under no circumstance” would he seek a third term, endorsing Taft for the nomination. 

Taft won a sound victory in 1908 against frequent Democratic candidate William Jennings Bryan, winning 29 states, and getting 8.9% more votes. While Roosevelt planned on shipping out for an African safari to avoid causing any distractions to Taft's presidency, his behavior at a gathering the day before the inauguration was emblematic of the shadow he would cast over the incoming presidency. Roosevelt’s charismatic and bold energy stole Taft's spotlight, making for an awkward first evening at the White House—a night Taft would later refer to as a “funeral” for his not yet started presidency.²

While Roosevelt believed Taft was a fitting successor to carry his legacy, several pivotal issues contrasted the men, seemingly unbeknownst to them until their following out. Their most crucial contrasting views were over the role of the presidency and executive leadership. Roosevelt believed the president could execute any power not explicitly prohibited, while Taft, a constitutionalist, believed the office was chiefly about executing policy and managing the government—not legislating. Their polar views of the presidency were exhibited in the issues that aroused controversy and later destroyed their relationship. 

Beyond politics, at 300 pounds, Taft was a stark contrast to Roosevelt's fit and active lifestyle. Taft's weight paired with his inability to understand the importance of image hurt his reputation with the public. The new president limited his interactions with the press, feeling his predecessor's incessant courting was unnecessary. While Roosevelt cultivated his image as an active sportsman, Taft allowed for unflattering photos to be taken and spent too much time on the golf course. From early in his presidency, Taft's frequent golf outings earned him the reputation of being sedated and elitist. 

While Taft came into office with the vision of administrative focus, the first test of his presidency and political might came in the form of a congressional debate over tariffs. In 1909, Congress began to negotiate a bill to re-adjust the tariff. As government debt mounted and a 1907 economic downturn temporarily hurt business, the stage was set for a battle between the conservative and progressive factions of the Republican Party. Conservatives, being more protectionist, wanted a higher tariff, while progressives, who believed tariffs hurt everyday workers demanded it be lowered. Taft would need to tread the fine line between these factions or risk polarization. Biographer, Lewis L. Gould termed Taft's dealings as “a self-inflicted wound that shaped the rest of his presidency.”³ As usual with tariff battles, every congressman came to the table with their specific constituencies' interests in mind. President Taft decided to remain out of negotiations and leave the initial dealings up to the House and Senate. Legislators nitpicked and squabbled over rates and the specific goods and industries that should be exempted. When the bill came to conference, the president gave his support along with moderate and progressive representatives. At the helm of conservative and tyrannical Republican speaker, Joseph Gurney Cannon, conservatives negotiated the bill to be more protective. By the end of negotiations, the Payne–Aldrich Tariff was praised by conservatives and criticized by progressives. Failing to understand the ramifications of his support, Taft endorsed the act as it passed both houses, signing it into law in August 1909. While historians generally label the tariff as moderate, progressives believed the seeds of betrayal had been laid and took their frustrations out on the new president. Progressive newspaper, the Kansas City Star called the act “a flagrant betrayal of the people”, while the Washington Post reported, “It is easy to pick flaws in the bill but it cannot be denied that as a whole, it is as good as any tariff legislation that has preceded it.”⁴ Taft, lacking foresight, proceeded to travel the nation, championing the Payne-Aldrich Act and bolstering his conservative allies in Congress. On September 17, Taft delivered an address in Winona Minnesota where he said, “I think the Payne Tariff Bill is the best tariff bill that the Republican Party ever passed.”⁵ The statement outraged progressives and further cemented their views that Taft was aligned with the conservatives. 

The tariff battle that raged throughout the special session in 1909 was underscored by dealings over proposed income and corporate taxes. Taft was generally supportive of a federal income tax but believed an amendment was required to establish it since the 1895 Supreme Court decision in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company ruled the tax unconstitutional. Taft's hesitancy to put his weight behind progressives to pass an act establishing a tax further put him at odds. 

While Taft was busy dealing with the tariff and planning his cross-country speaking tour, relations within his cabinet began to break down resulting in a showdown that would implicate Theodore Roosevelt and further split the GOP. Despite their many years working together, it seems Taft and Roosevelt never discussed the issue of conservation. Roosevelt, an extreme proponent of conservation, re-appointed Gifford Pinchot to head his effort to reserve extensive lands for conservation. Throughout this presidency, Pinchot and Roosevelt pushed interdepartmental initiatives to conserve land, while evading oversight. Taft viewed Pinchot as an overzealous conservationist, who overstated the risks of industrialization on the nation's environment. While Roosevelt, like Pinchot, believed in extensive conservation, Taft's views were more limited. Taft appointed Richard Ballinger to lead the Department of the Interior. Opposed to Pinchot, Taft and Ballinger’s views towards conservation were closely aligned. A close friend of Roosevelt, Pinchot had led the Department of Forestry since the McKinley administration. 

In an attempt to maximize efficiency, Taft limited his involvement in departmental affairs.⁶ His hands-off approach proved unhelpful when Ballinger and Pinchot began to feud over Ballinger's actions to undo some of Roosevelt's conservation policies, opening up some land for commercial activity. While tension mounted, Taft remained out of it, focusing his energy on defending the Payne–Aldrich Tariff. Taft said, “I think they misunderstand each other. But if they go on hitting each other I shall have to decide something between them.”⁷ In private, Taft was aligned with Ballinger, but in public and correspondence with Pinchot, he refused to take sides and urged the disgruntled forestry head to remain in the administration. When the Pinchot–Ballinger spat was leaked to the press, Taft still remained neutral and urged both to settle their dispute. As Pinchot's rhetoric heated, progressives rallied. It became increasingly clear to Taft that Pinchot was trying to become a political martyr. Pinchot took the feud to another level accusing Ballinger of acting corruptly, muddying the complex situation further. The public never fully understood the complexities of the accusations but they quickly perceived Taft's administration as in disarray. On January 6, 1910, a letter by Pinchot making accusations and detailing his insubordination was read to a shocked Congress. The president had no other choice but to fire the delinquent officer for his inappropriate behavior and insubordination. 

Throughout the scandal, Taft and Roosevelt never corresponded. Both felt the other should reach out first, and Taft, fearful of complicating things with a statement from Roosevelt, didn't want to draw him in. Taft's lack of communication forced Roosevelt to make his own conclusions, allowing maligned progressives to distort Roosevelt's perceptions. Taft never fully explained to Roosevelt why he fired Pinchot, despite being completely justified. Upon hearing of his firing Roosevelt said, “I most earnestly hope it is not true.”⁸ The Gifford–Pinchot Affair created cracks in their relationship that would continue to grow in the lead-up to 1912. Progressives conflated Pinchot’s firing, along with the removal of other Roosevelt appointees as slights against the progressive leader, while in reality, they were simply administrative actions. A congressional investigation found inconsistencies in Taft’s memoranda and his public statements, framing him as a liar in the public's mind. Resulting in little to no historic consequence, the legacy of the Ballinger–Pinchot Affair was a miscalculated public relations disaster for the Taft presidency. 

With two of his biggest controversies occurring in his first year, Taft’s term was off to a bad start. Despite being labeled as conservative by his Roosevelt-aligned adversaries, Taft's legacy is a mixed bag of progressivism and administrative reform. Policywise, Taft took sharp aim at breaking trusts. In his four years, Taft broke up more trusts than “The Great Trust Buster” Roosevelt had in his eight. Taft concluded Roosevelt’s work in breaking up Standard Oil and American Tobacco. He broke up the American Sugar Refining Company and U.S. Steel, the latter garnering criticism from Roosevelt.⁹ Taft and Roosevelt disagreed over the method of trust-busting. Roosevelt believed trusts could be distinguished between “good and bad” and thought Taft aimed his energy in the wrong way. Taft's signing of the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 furthered the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission to adjust exploitative rail rates. Taft also presided over expansions in oversight of emerging technology like telephones, telegraphs, and radio. 

To increase regulatory productivity, Taft divided the Department of Commerce and Labor into two. Taft believed the executive budget process was inefficient and overly complicated, resulting in budget discrepancies and overruns. Each agency would submit a budget to Congress and the allocation of each department culminated in the executive budget. Taft attempted to create one single administrative budget to better account for expenses and manage accounts. Congress refused to consent and Taft's budget plan failed to come to fruition. While Taft was rejected, his ideas foreshadowed the Executive Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which turned Taft's plan into law. 

Taft had the unprecedented opportunity to appoint 6 justices to the Supreme Court. His appointments created a conservative court that lasted until the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt in the 1930s. 

The Black community was no exception in distaining the 27th president. Taft was similar to Roosevelt and Wilson in holding discriminatory views about Black Americans. While, at points, he defended Black suffrage and argued against its suppression in the South, he believed Black people were inferior to white Americans and required supervision. The Black communities' biggest qualm with Taft was over his systemic patronage appointments to dilute the number of Black civil servants in the South. Taft's pro-white patronage won him some praise in the South, but his racism did not tilt the extremely Democratic region towards his Republicanism—a sign of both his racism and political ineptitude. 

Before the end of his first year in office, muckraker Ida Tarbell wrote, “Taft is done for, I fully believe. I have failed yet to meet a single person in whom he aroused the least interest. Not a man of discernment, but what shakes his head over him.”¹⁰ Taft was already unpopular in the minds of most Americans, and his political fate sat in the balance in the 1910 midterms. The conservative–progressive fracture that boiled over in an attempted overthrow of Speaker Cannan, Taft's inability to maneuver the situation, and his other policy missteps, resulted in a Republican trouncing at the polls. Democrats took control of the House and flipped seats in the Senate, allowing the slim Republican majority to be controlled by the anti-Taft progressives. Roosevelt returned from his exotic trip through Africa and Europe in June 1910, welcomed by an enormous outpouring of greeters. Roosevelt jumped back into the political scene, campaigning for progressive candidates in New York state races.¹¹

Throughout 1910, Roosevelt never attacked Taft directly, but by 1911 his gloves were off. Criticizing Taft for his trust-busting and personnel changes, while promoting a “New Nationalism” agenda, Roosevelt seemed like a clear contender for the 1912 Republican nomination. As Roosevelt's rhetoric heated and his proposals became more radical, Taft began to respond, defending his legacy and arguing a “reign of terror” would overtake America if the former president were re-elected.¹² In February 1912, Roosevelt made it official, saying “My hat is in the ring.” Throughout the Spring, the former friends tore into each other. Newly instituted primaries in several states provided evidence that Roosevelt was more popular with the people.¹³ When the Republican convention opened in Chicago in June, Roosevelt led the delegate count 271 to Taft's 71. The Taft-aligned conservative power holds emerged and maneuvered delegates to side with the president. Taft's men promised patronage and appointments to delegates and whipped votes into line. By the third day, Taft would secure the necessary delegates to win. Roosevelt, upset by the political maneuvering, led his delegates out of the convention and broke from the Republicans, forming the Progressive “Bull–Moose” Party. When Roosevelt formed this new orientation, Taft's fate in the general election was sealed. Between two popular progressives, Roosevelt and Wilson, Taft's conservatism was stale. Roosevelt led a bully campaign taking shots at Taft, while Wilson's refreshing progressivism appealed to voters. The election resulted in Wilson winning 435 delegates, Roosevelt 88, and Taft just 8. 

Overall, the Taft presidency represented a turning point in the history and landscape of progressive politics. His rhetoric and public stances reshaped the Republican Party and his administrative leadership provided exemplary tools and methods for future presidents. While his presidency was widely viewed as a failure, Taft wrote to his wife in 1912, “I have strengthened the Supreme Bench, have given a good deal of new and valuable legislation, have not interfered with business, have kept the peace, and on the whole have led people to pursue their various occupations without interruption. It is a very humdrum, uninteresting administration, and does not attract the attention or enthusiasm of anybody, but after I am out, I think that you and I can look back with some pleasure in having done something for the benefit of the public wealth.”¹⁴

In 1921, President Warren Harding appointed Taft as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Taft's service as a justice was fitting and complementary to his skills and style. While Taft, the man, certainly left a mark on the nation, his presidency was largely inconsequential.

1. Gould, Lewis L. The William Howard Taft Presidency. University Press of Kansas, 2009. xi

2. Ibid. 1

3. Ibid. 51

4. Ibid. 60-68

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid. 75-76

9. Arnold, Peri E. “William Taft: Domestic Affairs.” Miller Center, https://millercenter.org/president/taft/domestic-affairs. Accessed 12 April 2023.

10. Gould, Lewis L. The William Howard Taft Presidency. University Press of Kansas, 2009. 72

11. Arnold, Peri E. “William Taft: Campaigns and Elections.” Miller Center, https://millercenter.org/president/taft/campaigns-and-elections. Accessed 12 April 2023.

12. Ibid.

13. Horger, Marc T. “Roosevelt Returns.” eHISTORY, The Ohio State University, https://ehistory.osu.edu/exhibitions/1912/content/RooseveltReturns. Accessed 12 April 2023.

14. Gould, Lewis L. The William Howard Taft Presidency. University Press of Kansas, 2009. 194